Clinton Is Right

President Clinton’s decision on Apr.8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization seemed to be a massive miscalculation. The President took a drubbing from much of the press, which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag. The Cabinet and Whit House still appeared divided, and business leaders were characterized as furious over the lost opportunity. Zhu charged that Clinton lacked “the courage” to reach an accord. And when Clinton later telephoned the angry Zhu to pledge a renewed effort at negotiations, the gesture was widely portrayed as a flip-flop.

In fact, Clinton made the right decision in holding out for a better WTO deal. A lot more horse trading is needed before a final agreement can be reached. And without the Administration’s goal of a “bullet-proof agreement” that business lobbyists can enthusiastically sell to a Republican Congress, the whole process will end up in partisan acrimony that could harm relations with China for years.

THE HARD PART. Many business lobbyists, while disappointed that the deal was not closed, agree that better terms can still be had. And Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, National Economic Council Director Gene B. Sperling, Commerce Secretary William M. Daley, and top trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky all advised Clinton that while the Chinese had made a remarkable number of concessions, “we’re not there yet,” according to senior officials.

Negotiating with Zhu over the remaining issues may be the easy part. Although Clinton can signal U.S. approval for China’s entry into the WTO himself, he needs Congress to grant Beijing permanent most-favored-nation status as part of a broad trade accord. And the temptation for meddling on Capital Hill may prove over-whelming. Zhu had barely landed before Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) declared himself skeptical that China deserved entry into the WTO. And Senators Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.) and Emest F. Hollings (D-S. C.) promised to introduce a bill requiring congressional approval of any deal.

The hidden message from these three textile-state Southerners: Get more protection for the U. S. clothing industry. Hoping to smooth the way, the Administration tried, but failed, to budge Zhu on textiles. Also left in the lurch: Wall Street, Hollywood, and Detroit. Zhu refused to open up much of the lucrative Chinese securities market and insisted on “cultural” restrictions on American movies and music. He also blocked efforts to allow U. S. auto makers to provide fleet financing.

BIG JOB. Already, business lobbyists are blanketing Capitol Hill to presale any eventual agreement, but what they’ve heard so far isn’t encouraging. Republicans, including Lott, say that “the time just isn’t right” for the deal. Translation: We’re determined to make it look as if Clinton has capitulated to the Chinese and is ignoring human, religious, and labor rights violations; the theft of nuclear-weapons technology; and the sale of missile parts to America’s enemies. Beijing’s fierce critics within the Democratic Party, such as Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota and House Minority leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, won’t help, either.

Just how tough the lobbying job on Capitol Hill will be become clear on Apr. 20, when Rubin lectured 19chief executives on the need to discipline their Republican allies. With business and the White House still trading charges over who is responsible for the defeat of fast-track trade negotiating legislation in 1997, working together won’t be easy.

And Republicans—with a wink—say that they’ll eventually embrace China’s entry into the WTO as a favor to Corporate America. Though not long before they torture Clinton. But Zhu is out on a limb, and if Congress overdoes the criticism, he may be forced by domestic critics to renege. Business must make this much dear to both its GOP allies and the Whit House: This historic deal is too important to risk losing to any more partisan squabbling

1. The main idea of this passage is

[A]. The Contradiction between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.

[B]. On China’s entry into WTO.

[C]. Clinton was right.

[D]. Business Lobbyists Control Capitol Hill.

2. What does the sentence “Also left in the lurch: Wall Street, Hollywood, Detroit” convey?

[A]. Premier Zhu rejected their requirements.

[B]. The three places overdid criticism.

[C]. They wanted more protection.

[D]. They are in trouble.

3. What was the attitude of the Republican Party toward China’s entry into the WTO?

[A]. Contradictory. [B].Appreciative.

[C]. Disapproving. [D]. Detestful.

4. Who plays the leading part in the deal in America?

[A]. White House . [B]. Republicans.

[C]. The Democratic Party. [D]. Businessmen.

5. It can be inferred from the passage that

[A]. America will make concessions.

[B]. America will hold out for a better WTO

[C]. Clinton has the right to signal U. S. approval for China’s entry.

[D]. Democratic party approve China’s entry into the WTO.

答案：

1. C. 总统是对的。这篇文章摘自Business Weekly. 文章是从商人的角度来看待中国加入WTO，他们希望从谈判中获得更多的利益，而克林顿的同意不同意的目的和他们相符——争取更多利益。这篇就是从四方利益最终趋向一致“同意中国加入世贸”来证明“总统结论正确”的中心思想。四级英语查询

第一段指出Clinton由打发朱总理回国，不同意中国入世到一百八十度大转弯，在电话中愤怒的朱总理表示再次努力协商。内阁和白宫官员意见分歧，商人对失去机会火冒三丈。

第二段点出克林顿故意拖延以谋取更多的利益的决定是正确的——文章的主旨句。商人院外活动集团成员要以“政府完美无缺的协议的目标来说服共和党赞成/接受。以免整个过程以党争而告终。

第三，四段是商业方面的高级官员的代表纷纷却说Clinton“当中国作出许多优惠让步时，美国不在那里。”(意：美国吃亏了现在不要再吃亏了。)克林顿有权签署赞成中国加入世贸组织，可他需要国会批准北京永久性最惠国作为扩大贸易协定的组成部分。再说对国会的干预的诱惑力相当大：就在朱踏上美国本土时，参议院多数派领袖Trent Lott宣布他对中国是该不该入世持怀疑态度，而参议院Tesse A Helms… 承诺提出一项要求国会批准任何交易的提案。

第五段讲了朱总理的强硬立场。第六段又是共和党的反对声，使民主党内站在北京以便的批评家也无能为力。

最后一段指出：尽管困难重重，这一历史事件太重要了，不能因党争而冒失失去机会的危险。

A. 民主党和共和党的矛盾。两党之争见上文译注，最终还是一致。 B. 论中国加入世贸组织。文章不是论中国加入而是论美国环绕中国入世贸的种种。 D. 商人院外活动集团成员控制国会。这在第五段中提到商人院外活动集团成员阻挠美国国会事先接受最终协议，但不是主题思想。

2. A. 朱总理拒绝了他们的要求。见难句译注9。B. 这三个地方批评过头。 C. 他们要求更多的保护。 D. 他们陷入困境。

3. A. 矛盾。共和党一开始就反对。什么对中国该不该加入世贸组织持怀疑态度。第六段说得更露骨，时间不对。意思是他们想把整个事件看起来好象克林顿屈从于中国，忽视了“中国违反人权，宗教权，劳动权，偷窃核武器技术，把导弹组成部件买给美国的敌人”等事实。最后一段共和党一下子又所他们最终将会接受中国加入世贸组织以表示对整体美国的好感。不管是商人院外活动集团的作用，还是明确指出重开谈判的重要性。这一历史事件太重要绝不能因党争而失去机会。共和党纵然心中不愿，也不得不接受现实。心情是矛盾的。B. 赞赏。 C. 不赞成。 D. 厌恶。

4. D. 商界。第一段中就点出：商界领袖对失去这次机会火冒三丈。第二段中提到商界院外活动成员要以实实在在的协议来说服共和党国会，免得以党争告终。第三段明确指出：许多商界院外人士一方面对协议未签定表示失望，另方面又同意，还会更好的条件。各种和商界直接关系的高级官员对克林顿劝说。

第五段：纺织，金融股票，汽车以至电影等都是商界的要求。朱总理拒绝的就是商界要求。

第六段提及商界院外活动的成员制止国会事先接受最终协定。

最后一段又是商界使共和党联盟和白宫懂得此事的重要性。

5. A. 美国将会作出让步，见上面注释。商人是绝对不会放弃中国市场的。

B. 美国会故意拖延以求取得更好的条件。这一点恐怕不会，见上文注释。朱总理的强硬立场，商人的见解。 C. 克林顿有签署批准中国入世之权。 D. 民主党赞成中国加入世贸，这两项都是事实。